Cloud computing is without a doubt one of the most significant innovations presented in the global technological map. This new generation of technology has the potential to positively change our lives since on the one hand it provides capabilities that make our digital lives much easier, than before, while on the other hand it assists developers in creating services that can be disseminated easier and faster, than before, and with significantly less cost.
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4 privacy requirements should be implemented within the system, which should enclose all the necessary measures for dealing with possible security and privacy threats that will cause harm to its assets or users. A number of research efforts [8] [9] [10] [11] have already contributed to the area of identifying and analyzing security and privacy requirements for the development of software systems. However, these works have not been developed for cloud-based systems. On the other hand, industry-led reports [1, 2, 12] have been published discussing security and privacy issues within the context of cloud computing. However, most of these reports provide a list of security and/or privacy issues without providing a clear linkage with relevant security and privacy properties and threats. Moreover, they do not explicitly discuss any set of requirements that are essential for analysis and design methodologies to incorporate, to support security and privacy analysis for cloud based systems.
This paper makes a number of contributions. Figure 1 provides an overview of our contributions. On the one hand, we discuss a number of security and privacy properties that are applicable to the cloud. Our work in that area is based on the highly influential and important report from the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) [13] and work from an EU report on cloud computing [14] . However, our work introduces a number of security and privacy
properties that are not discussed in these reports. On the other hand, we provide a clear linkage between those properties and relevant security and privacy threats. In particular, based on the list of threats published by CSA [3] and Gartner [15] , we discuss how each of the security and privacy properties can be linked to specific threats. Finally, we provide set of requirements that we consider important for any development methodology that supports analysis and design of security and privacy in the cloud. Although, we do not claim that the list of presented requirements is final (on the contrary we believe it is work in progress), we believe the list provides a good starting point for any developers that would like to consider inclusion of cloud security and privacy analysis in their methodology. As shown in Figure 1 , we start with cloud computing areas and conclude with list of requirements based on the security and privacy properties, threats and critical areas.
Figure 1. Overview of the contribution
Section 2 provides a brief overview of the basic cloud-computing characteristics. In section 3, the most critical cloud computing areas are presented along with security and privacy threats. In section 4, the major security and privacy properties are discussed and a clear linkage is provided between issues, threats and properties. Moreover, a set of requirements is presented for methodologies based on the linkage of issues, threats and properties in section 5. Section 6 presents related work both on software engineering methods both in the fields of traditional systems as well as cloud oriented. Finally, section 7 presents areas for future work and concludes the paper.
Cloud Computing main characteristics
Cloud computing is the delivery of computing and storage capacity as a service [12] to a community of end-recipients. Cloud computing entrusts services with a user's data, software and computation over a network, following a logical diagram as shown in Figure 2 . Cloud computing providers offer their services according to three fundamental models [16] [17] [18] : a)
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), where users rent use of servers provided by one or more cloud providers; b) Platform as a Service (PaaS), where users rent use of servers and the system software to use in them; and c) Software as a Service (SaaS), where users rent also application software and databases. In the cloud, IaaS is the most basic and each higher model abstracts from the details of the lower models as it is graphically shown in Figure 3 .
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6 Cloud computing provides the following characteristics: a) Agility, which improves users' ability to re-provision technological infrastructure resources; b) Cost, which is reduced since infrastructure is typically provided by a third party and does not need to be purchased for one-time or infrequent intensive computing e) Reliability, which is improved if multiple redundant sites are used, which makes well-designed cloud computing suitable for business continuity and disaster recovery [21] ; f) Scalability and elasticity, which support the on-demand provisioning of resources on a fine-grained self-service basis near real-time without users having to engineer for peak loads [22] [23] ;
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g) Device and location independence, which support users to access cloud services from anyplace through a web-browser regardless of the device they are using or the location they are accessing the service from [24] .
h) Maintenance, which is easier since there is no software installation on each user's machine and the services' sources are managed and updated from single third party.
It is worth mentioning, that although the combination of the above characteristics is what provides the various advantages of cloud computing, it is the same combination that introduces new security and privacy challenges and requires different solutions. The following section provides an analysis of the critical areas and major threats that exist in cloud environments.
Critical Areas and Threats of Cloud Computing
Building new services in the cloud or even adopting cloud computing into existing business context in general is a complex decision involving many factors. Enterprises and organizations have to make their choices related to services and deployment models as well as to adjust their operational procedures into a cloud oriented scheme combined with a A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T
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8 comprehensive risk assessment practice resulting from their needs. In doing so, it is important to have a clear understanding of the critical areas, with respect to security and privacy, of a cloud computing solution. This section provides an overview of the critical areas of cloud computing and security and privacy threats that can affect to the cloud based system context.
Critical Areas of Cloud Computing
We performed a systematic review [25] of the literature, which started by identifying studies that consider cloud-computing areas, alongside security and privacy as domain specific key words. We focused on areas that are important to cloud-based systems, such as virtualization, interoperability, regulatory compliance, and identity management. We followed these key words to specifically search the literature. We also identified relevant literature from major research databases such as Elesevier, IEEE Xplore, SpringerLink, ACM Digital Library, and Google scholar. We considered only peer-reviewed papers and considered citations and place of publication of individual papers as inclusion criteria besides key words. Our results indicated that there is no much literature that focuses on identifying critical areas of cloud computing. A report of the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) recommended a list of critical areas of cloud computer that match with our key words and we decided to select this work for the critical areas [13] . The areas recommended by CSA are mainly focused on governance and operations issues considering both provider and user perspectives. For instance, strategic and policy issues are addressed through governance domains, while the operational domains deal with security concerns and implementation techniques within the Cloud architecture. In the rest of the section we discuss these areas, focusing our discussion in the context of information systems development methodologies and techniques.
a) Cloud Computing Architectural Framework
This domain focuses on providing a conceptual framework and description of concepts used in cloud. Cloud Computing architecture is analyzed from the aspect of IT and security professionals. This sub areas are considered, i.e., a complete lexicon of terminologies used, requirements and challenges of cloud's architecture in order security to be implemented, and a taxonomy model that involves cloud computing services and architectures. The architecture framework includes unique cloud characteristics such as virtualization technologies and multi-tenancy for the cloud service and deployment model.
b) Governance and Enterprise Risk Management
Governance is related to the organization and entails the control and supervision over the operational and procedural activities of the cloud services. In particular, issues like policies, procedures, application development standards, design, legal issues, service monitoring, testing and implementation are activities that organization employees are involved with. However, cloud migration requires examining policies and legal issues extensively with the new type of dependencies and business models. Threats relating to agreement breaches, cloud providers transparency, sensitive data protection need adequate attention. Organization should have the ability to govern and measure the enterprise risks considering the strategic and operational activities.
c) Legal Issues: Contracts and Electronic Discovery
Cloud architecture poses legal issues that mainly concern its usage. Both providers and customers need to comply with existing regulatory requirements and Service
Level Agreements (SLAs) between the user and provider. Legal issues consider the protection requirements relating to SLA/contractual obligation, privacy, laws and legislation. Note that before adapting cloud into the existing business context, organization should perform due diligence by evaluating its existing practice, organizational needs, and constraints to identify the requirements. Periodic monitoring, testing and evaluating of the migrated entities are also necessary. Finally the area considers the electronic document identification. Security issues are critical
for the e-discovery.
d) Compliance and Audit
Legal compliance is a significant challenge for cloud-based systems. Due to the nature of the domain, service models and ubiquitous morphology organization needs to deal with the issues like, evaluation of compliance issues that is affected by deploying cloud. Legal and regulatory law issues that a cloud provider has to conform depend on the location of their services. Therefore several operational functions, like data lifecycle management, physical infrastructure requirements, electronic discovery, security and privacy obligations, etc. are affected, in a way that customer's security and privacy could be violated. The area focuses on some guideline necessary during the audit for the compliance. Both internal and external audit and control play necessary role for cloud from user and provider perspectives.
e) Information Management and Data Security
A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T threat that is linked to the issue is investigate support [4, 30] . An examination of incident response lifecycle is necessary including detecting and handling the incident, SLA integrated with incident response, within this area.
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j) Application Security
This area deals with the security issues throughout the life time of an application from design to deployment and maintenance into cloud. Threats that an application is going to exposed to in cloud environment is higher comparing to compare to traditional data centre. Therefore, an application needs to ensure security from both internal and external malicious environment. In particular, the level of the access of employees or cloud clients, to physical and virtual assets, can take advantage of them in such a way that data confidentiality could be compromised or even control of cloud services could be taken, without the risk of detection [3, 4, 29] . The area includes issues like authentication, authorization of the user to access the application, monitor the application, a secure SDLC, security assurance program, application penetration testing, and other relevant areas.
k) Encryption and Key Management
Data should be encrypted, if necessary, in any form of usage so that it can prevent potential data leakage that is particularly critical in cloud environment. Context aware encryption or format preserving encryption is commonly used in cloud deployment.
Key management is a difficult process in cloud computing, in particular within the multi tenancy model. This area considers issues like storage and safe guarding of keys, key management practice, trusted cryptographic services are relevant for this context.
l) Identity, entitlement and Access Management
Considering traditional computing, identity management is changed in cloud by including entitlement in the access management process. In particular, cloud service and application use various sources to identity it users, entitlement management provides decision-making process for authorizing access to the system, process, and data within cloud. This area covers all types' identity that are relevant for the domain such as users, device, code, organization, and agents. Key points for the identify of all entities are strength of identity and attributes, should provide greater flexibility in cloud internally within the organization boundaries or external public cloud. The access in cloud can be network, system, application, process, and data. The entitlement process should link with the user business requirements and security requirements into a set of rule to govern access to different entities of the cloud.
Issues arise when an organization attempts to extend its identity procedures and
policies; this area helps the organization to verify if it is ready to migrate to a cloudoriented Identity Enterprise Architecture.
m) Virtualization
Virtualization is one of the fundamental technologies used in the cloud infrastructure.
It allows the cloud infrastructure to be shared among multiple users but logically separated area through hypervisor technology to support multi tenancy and better server utilization. Hypervisor is important in order to maintain the security, integrity and privacy of users and overall system context [29, 31] . A VM's actions must be restricted to the level that has been granted from the contract agreement. Escaping from a VM to another VM, or to the hypervisor is an unwanted situation. Virtual network traffic is not visible to the physical network security devices as a consequence it is difficult to detect and control possible intrusions [4] . Hypervisor needs to be completely isolated from actions from and to the hypervisor in order for the system to be completely safe. VM also poses threats from cohabitation techniques that referred to the IP pattern recognition techniques, just to achieve co-residency with the victim's VM and launch a series of attacks [32] . Vulnerability or a misconfiguration in virtualization or in hypervisor's kernel may result in system compromise and take down the whole cloud. Isolation needs also to be examined from another point of view, that of purpose limitation. Rights and roles should be established in order for the level of access to be determined for the cloud employees, this way data usage should be limited to what is necessary [14] . Malicious insiders, shared technology issues and data loss or leakage are the threats related to this issue.
Therefore VM specific security requirements and up-to-date security policies for the VM are necessary for this area.
n) Security as a Service
Security is one of the main concerns in cloud computing and present strong barrier for the cloud adaption. Generally in a SLA, standard security framework should specify which security services are provided and how. This area considers enterprise security for the cloud. Issues like visibility of user security control, proper credential and background check, protect data leakage in VM instances need adequate attention under this area. Security obligations from incident detection to proper access management are deposited on a trusted third party. The benefit of this service is that the user has the ability to choose the appropriate security service and not necessary to rely on providers' choices, that is almost entirely cut out from security implementation procedures and techniques. Security measures should be taken to protect both client and provider from possible attacks.
Major threats in Cloud Computing
To identify relevant threats, we have followed the same literature review approach described in the previous section. We have focused on several papers that consider security and privacy threats in the Cloud. An overview of the papers that we examined is provided in the related work section. However we have decided to define a list of threats based on the reports of CSA [3] and Gartner [15] , because these works are comprehensive and there is a link that can be provided between the identified threats and the critical areas described in the previous section. Our analysis identified 14 different threats. It is important to indicate that only some of these threats are specific to cloud computing (see for example threat 1) while most of the threats can also be found in traditional distributed systems. We have focused however our discussion, of the identified threats, in the context of cloud computing.
a) Threat #1: Abuse and Nefarious Use of Cloud Computing
Abuse and nefarious use of cloud benefits derive from the result of several reasons. Remediation domains and has applicability on IaaS and PaaS service models.
b) Threat #2: Insecure interfaces and APIs
A variety of software interfaces and APIs are in use in order for the cloud services to be managed by the customers. Several actions like, management, provisioning, orchestration and monitoring are carried out through them. Customers, organizations and third parties interact with general cloud services through APIs, to build upon these and offer services to their 1 Partial anonymity through weak registration. 2 Limitations on fraud detection capabilities.
A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
15 customers, so as a result security and availability are crucial. Confidentiality, integrity, availability and accountability are some of the issues that organizations are exposed through vulnerable APIs and interfaces 3 . The specific threat is matched with the Application Security domain and has applicability on IaaS, PaaS and SaaS service models.
c)Threat #3: Malicious Insiders
A malicious insider is a realistic scenario that a client cannot take immediate action.
Opaque processes and procedures, not strict access to cloud's resources both physical and virtual, deficient monitoring, policy incompliance and improper employee hiring standards and in general lack of transparency are creating an attractive environment that could enable a potential adversary to gain control over cloud services and tamper data that rely on them.
The specific threat is matched with the Governance and Enterprise Risk Management as well as with the Traditional Security, Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery domains and has applicability on IaaS, PaaS and SaaS service models.
d) Threat #4: Shared technology issues
Virtualization is the concept that cloud computing notion is built upon. Dynamic provisioning of services in multi-tenant environment due to hardware virtualization (e.g., CPU, RAM, Disk partitions etc.) are promising advantages. On the other hand, the underlying infrastructure does not offer strong isolation between tenants, and as a result a virtualization hypervisor was implemented to fill this gap but still the issue has to be completely addressed to prevent any type of data leakage. 
g) Threat #7: Unknown Risk Profile
Seemingly insignificant factors about security should be considered by organizations. 
m) Threat #13: Investigate Support
In case of a security violation a properly configured forensics system should be ready, in order to examine the causes and the circumstances of the incident. Such actions are 5 Data processes, security and privacy procedures, etc. 
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Matching Threats with Cloud Service Models and Critical Areas
It is necessary to understand how the identified threats link with the cloud models and cloud areas, so that appropriate security and privacy properties can be justified to address the threats. This section provides the linking between the threats with cloud service models and critical areas. Table 1 presents the result of the matching between threats and cloud service models.
It should be noted that the matching of threats 1-7 to the relevant service models has been done by CSA [3] , while we have improved on that work by adding the matching of threats 8-14 to the service models. Focusing on threats 8-14, it is clear that some threats are applicable to all service models. Privileged use access covers all service models, because is referred to the fact that certain employees have access rights to the cloud's services and as a result customer's data due to the nature of their work. Data location threat covers all service models, because data lifecycle process happens from these three models and it's important for users to know each country's laws and regulations as this subject is concerned. Long term viability is applicable to all service models, because it describes that cloud services should be functional all the time and providers should be clear about the procedures that are followed, when are no longer able to provide them.
Some of the threats are more applicable to IaaS such as shared technology issues, due to flaws of the virtualization technology. Lack of recovery can directly affect on unavailability of platform and software as a service. Regulatory compliance covers Paas and SaaS service models, due to the fact that cloud providers should comply with each country's regulations as specific cloud matters are concerned. Lack of segregation threat, is a virtualization flaw that causes problems to vm isolation that's why only matches PaaS and SaaS service models. Lack of recovery is a common problem in cloud environments and is referred to the inability of the provider to provide a recovery system for the data from a possible attack or a disaster. That's the reason that matches only with the last two service models. Investigate support covers only the PaaS and SaaS layers, because if an incident occurs in the cloud, a digital forensics system should provide instant information from the investigation in these layers. 
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20 legal and compliance areas. Therefore, as stated previously, we need to control a identify and analyse threat and its consequences if that affect to a critical area that is relevant from the user perspective. 
Security and Privacy Properties and Threats
As indicated above, it is important to identify the set of security and privacy properties that are related to cloud computing environments. We have used the existing literature for eliciting the relevant security and privacy properties such as the European Commission Draft
Report on Security Issues in Cloud Computing [14] , CSA report [13] , NIST guideline [33] and other relevant literature. Moreover, we have used our previous work in that area [5, 11, [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] and we have also identified new concepts based on our analysis of the critical areas presented in the previous section. Finally we link these properties with the threats and issues relating to critical areas in cloud.
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Security and Privacy Properties in Cloud
For each property, we provide a brief explanation along with graphical illustration of the property. It is worth mentioning that we have identified two different types of properties, those that can also be found in traditional distributed systems security/privacy, such as Availability, and those are that are unique to the cloud context, such as Isolation. However, our discussion below focuses on how all these properties can be understood within the context of cloud computing.
a) Isolation
The property of isolation refers to the complete seal of user's data inside the Cloud computing environment. Due to multi-tenant environments, cloud-computing resources are introduced to risks related to information disclosure. As a result strong isolation must be achieved inside the cloud environment as shown in Figure 4 . Isolation addresses data disclosure in two ways: limit the point of view and support hypervisor hardening [14] . 
c) Traceability
This property aims to give the ability, for the data to be traced or not by the user. Data erasure is a major problem in web-based systems and this is also true for cloud-based systems. Many cases have been documented for privacy violations due to inappropriate handling of data deletion (documents, photos, etc.). As such, traceability aims to reassure cloud clients that their data has been completely deleted or stay invisible and anonymized through the ability of tracing them among data repositories as shown in Figure 6 . 
d) Availability
The availability property refers to the ability to support continuous service as per the agreement and reduce the factors that can break such continuity such as security attacks (for example DoS attacks), physical disasters and/or hardware failure. Unavailability of service or data can have severe impact on the customer business. Figure 7 provides an example of availability.
Figure 7. Availability Example e) Integrity
Integrity refers to the ability to avoid clients' data unauthorized modification. In particular , all data must be modified in a legitimate way by legitimate authority. According to EU directives [14] , cloud providers must assure users that their data has not been tampered while it was passed through the whole data life cycle.
Figure 8. Integrity Example
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The confidentiality property derives from the fact that cloud is multi-tenancy environment and many of its resources are shared. That raises concerns about the data that communicates within a cloud, from the cloud provider to the client, and vice versa. Figure 9 shows different phases of data from it generation to destruction and confidentiality needs to be ensured all these phases. Encryption techniques and authorization and authentication mechanisms can support data's confidentiality [14] . 
g) Transparency
The transparency property refers to the cloud vendor's obligation, to be completely clear about their procedures and functions. In order to preserve integrity and confidentiality of a client's data, transparency in several areas of cloud's procedures should exist. According to EU directive, transparency must exist in regard to the contractors and subcontractors that cloud providers are related to and the internal cloud operations and procedures that the provider follows in certain circumstances [14] [15] . As shown in Figure 10 , provider should provide report to ensure the transparency about the activities that handle critical user assets.
Figure 10. Transparency Example
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The Intervenability property refers to the fact that users should be able to process their data despite the cloud's service architecture as shown in Figure 11 . A cloud vendor may rely on other provider's (subcontractor) services in order to offer his services. That should not be an obstacle for the user to intervene 6 to his data, in fact cloud vendor must be able to provide all the technical and organizational means to this goal including subcontractors [14] . 
i) Portability
The Portability property aims to achieve data transferability, among different cloud providers and services. As we mentioned earlier data or vendor lock-in could result in lack of data portability and interoperability between different cloud services. Figure 12 depicts how portability can be achieved among different providers using the same data. The use of a standard format could impose obstacles in the transfer of personal data or even result in data disuse, due to the lack of compatibility, if a cloud vendor is bankrupted [14] . 6 Access, rectification, erasure, blocking and objection. 
j) Accountability
The Accountability property is referred to the fact that, cloud providers should provide information anytime about an incident. Figure 13 provides an example about accountability within the cloud environment. The cloud architecture 7 makes a complex form of an informational system. In terms of management and audit controls, this fact could result in very difficult manageability of incidents. A cloud provider should be able at any time to provide information about any incident, what an entity did and when, just to trace malicious actions from the whole cloud infrastructure [14] . 
k) Identification
The Identification property has a twofold role. Firstly to protect both the user that accesses a resource or service within the cloud as well as the user's data stored in the cloud. 7 International services residual.
Secondly to allow only authorized people to access those data. Specifically, when an external user accesses, as shown in Figure 14 , a service the cloud provider should check if this service requires users' identification or not. In the first case the user will have to be authenticated and authorized to access the specific service. In the second case Identification requirement will work oppositely thus preventing the cloud provider from storing any identifiable or traceable information regarding the external user. It should be noted that user anonymity is not ensured since this is not an anonymity service, just a transaction without providing identities. If anonymity is also required then the respective requirement described below, should also be applied. 
l) Authentication
The authentication property is necessary to ensure that only eligible users have access to various cloud services. Similar to the traditional distributed system, cloud provider only grant permission to the legitimate user as shown in Figure 15 . Therefore, providers should also ensure protection from possible attackers who fail to prove their identity to the cloud service provider. 
m) Authorisation
Authorisation follows authentication. Specifically, users' private data should only be accessed by authorized users. When a user submits a request to the cloud provider, as shown in Figure 16 , the nature of the request should first be checked since it is not legal for example to ask from that user to login for a service that identification is not needed. If the user requests specific services or access to data that need authorisation then she should pass the authentication process and then, according to her rights, get the privileges for accessing or not the specific service or data.
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Figure 16. Authorization Example n) Data Protection
The aim of this property is to ensure that every transaction involving personal data is realized according to the organisation's privacy regulations and Directive 95/46/EU [42] regarding the processing of personal data and the free movement of such data. When a user tries to access private data, an identification process is triggered for identifying the user and for granting her with the rights of reading, processing, storing, or deleting private data.
Subsequently, if the user asks to perform any of the above tasks the cloud provider checks whether this complies with the privacy regulations and the request is either granted or denied, accordingly. Thus, there are two intermediate "inspections" before actually a user is able to perform various tasks on other users' private data.
o) Anonymity
The property anonymity means the state of being anonymous or virtually invisible, and having the ability to operate online without being tracked [43] . Therefore, anonymity is the ability of a user to use a resource or service without disclosing his/her identity [44] as shown in Figure 17 . A formal definition for anonymity is given by A [41] . Let RU denote the event that an entity U (e.g. a user) performs a role R during an event E. Let A denote an attacker and NCA the set of entities that are not cooperating with A. An entity U is called anonymous in role R for an event E against an attacker A if for each observation B that A can make the
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30 following relation holds:U΄  NC A :0 < P(R U΄ |B) < 1. The outcome of the above definitions is that anonymity serves the great purpose of hiding personal identifiable information when there is no need of revealing them. Browsing the Internet only for collecting information is one of many issues that anonymity plays a significant role and must be attained.
Figure 17. Anonymity Example p) Pseudonymity
Pseudonymity is the user's ability to use a resource or service by acting under one or many pseudonyms, thus hiding his/her real identity. However, under certain circumstances the possibility of translating pseudonyms to real identities exists. Pseudonyms are aliases for a user's real identity such as shown in Figure 18 . Users are allowed to operate under different aliases. Nevertheless revelation of user's real identity occurs when acting unlawfully.
Pseudonymity has characteristics similar to anonymity in that user is not identifiable but can be tracked through the aliases he/she uses [43] . Pseudonymity is used for protecting user's identity in cases where anonymity cannot be provided (e.g. if the user has to be held accountable for his/her activities [44] [45] . 
q) Unlinkability
The property unlinkability expresses the inability to link related information [43] . In particular, unlinkability is successfully achieved when an attacker is unable to link specific information with the user that processes that information. Also unlinkability can be successfully achieved between a sender and a recipient. In that case unlinkability means that though the sender and recipient can both be identified as participating in some communication, they cannot be identified as communicating with each other. A. Pfitzmann in [46] addresses unlinkability in the following formal way. Figure 19 provides an example of unlinkability. Let X E,F denotes the event so that E and F have a corresponding characteristic X. Two events E and F are unlinkable in regard of a characteristic X for an attacker A, if for each observation B that A can make, the probability that E and F are corresponding in regard of X given B is greater than zero and less than one: 0 < P(X E,F B) < 1. The ability to link transactions could give a stalker an idea of your daily habits or an insurance company an idea of how much alcohol your family consumes over a month. Ensuring unlinkability is vital for protecting user's privacy. 
r) Unobservability
Unobservability protects users from being observed or tracked while browsing the Internet or accessing a service. Unobservability is similar to unlinkability, shown in Figure   20 , in the sense that the attacker aims to reveal users identifiable information by observing rather than linking the information he/she retrieves. A formal representation of unobservability is stated as follows [46] . An event E is unobservable for an attacker A if for each observation B that A can make, the probability of E given B is greater than zero and less than 1. 0 < P(EB) < 1 
Cloud Security and Privacy Properties and Threats
In order to make the above set of properties useful to method developers, we present a matching between the presented properties and the various threats discussed in previous sections, as shown in Table 3 . Note that we use IAA to denote identification, authentication and authorisation in the table. In particular, we identify relevant security and privacy properties can address the threats based on the issues relating to critical areas. In the last column a number of technical security and privacy properties are mentioned that can be realised for resolving the security or privacy issue of the listed cloud threats. Thus, through this table it can be easily seen which are the basic security and privacy areas, which threat has an impact on which area and how the new security and privacy concepts identified before can be matched in order to provide proper guidance to analysts when considering the implementation of secure and privacy oriented services in the cloud.
The basic security properties such as confidentiality, integrity, and authentication are necessary to address the threats that relates with compliance, insiders, data protection. Data plays a central role for the cloud based system context and organisations and individuals
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34 would have to hand in their personal and organizational data into service providers over which they have no control. Therefore, data needs appropriate protection throughout its phases from generation to distribution from all possible threats and most of the security and privacy properties are applicable on this occasion. We need to understand the dependency chain relating to API considering all these properties for the data protection. It is necessary to have reliable service availability, thus cloud services should have continuity so that lack of recovery and long term viability do not pose any service interruption. Client side protection needs user's IAA specifically strong access control mechanism is required. Similar forensic activities need IAA and accountability for the proper investigation of any malicious activities.
Property like portability is necessary to handle issues relating to vendor or data lock-in.
Privacy properties such as anonymity, unlinkability, and unobservability are necessary where we need to appropriate protection of sensitive information. For instance, data protection or protect from any insider attack it is necessary to provide adequate technical and organizational measure for the preservation of the privacy properties. Transparency of user activities is also necessary for addressing the threats relating to insiders. Furthermore, provenanceability besides anonymity and isolation are necessary to address the threats such as shared technology, data leakage & lack of segregation relating to virtualization. Depending on the organizational specific context, it is necessary to determine and in-depth analysis of relevant security and privacy properties to support the needs. However, users should define their security best practice and practice effective information security management system to obtain the maximum benefit for the cloud migration.
Requirements for a Methodology to Support Security and Privacy Analysis
Based on our analysis of the critical issues of cloud computing (Section 3.1), the security and privacy threats in the cloud (Section 3.2) and the security and privacy properties related to the cloud (Section 4), we have identified a number of challenges that make the integration of requirements and design analysis into the development stages of a software systems development methodology considering cloud based system. These are:  Requirement 5: It should consider relevant security and privacy properties, threats, and risks and be able to identify appropriate measures and mechanisms to control security and privacy threats and risks and satisfy the security and privacy properties (Challenge 5).
 Requirement 6: It should provide mechanisms to clearly identify a linkage between security and privacy issues and relevant threats and properties. To support an easy facilitation of such linkage we have identified, in Table 3 , an association between security and privacy issues, and the threats and properties we have presented in the previous sections. Although we do not claim the list to be extensive nor final, we believe it can be used as a starting point and be modified and/or extended as required (Challenge 5). 
Related Work
Our work focuses on the integration of cloud computing and security and privacy. This section presents works that are related to our work. We first discuss requirements engineering methods that consider security and privacy issues then related work within the cloudcomputing domain.
There are works that focus on the development of requirements engineering methods to support security and privacy issues during the development of software systems. Mouratidis & Giorgini [47] proposed Secure Tropos, an extension of Tropos methodology, which employs the concepts of security constraints, secure dependency, and secure goal amongst others. The approach supports the analysis of security from the Requirements Engineering phase. Houmb et al. introduced the SecReq approach to elicit, analyse and trace security requirements, starting from the requirements engineering phase to design [39] . A misuse case driven approach is used to establish visual links between use cases and misuse cases for eliciting security requirements at an early stage of the development [10] . PriS is a requirements engineering method that incorporates privacy requirements as organisational goals that need to be satisfied and adopts the use of privacy process patterns as a way to: (a) describe the effect of privacy requirements on business processes; and (b) facilitate the identification of the system architecture that best supports the privacy-related business processes [35, 48] . Islam et al. use natural language patterns, with the Hohfeld legal taxonomy, to extract security requirements from laws and combine them with the ISO/IEC policies and finally trace the identified requirements into the secure system design [49] [50] .
Four methodological activities are used to evaluate existing security and privacy requirements for legal compliance [51] . The approach in particular prioritizes the requirements and establishes traceability links from requirements to legal texts. A model based process is proposed to support security and privacy requirements engineering using a set of concepts such as goal, actor, constraint, and threat [11] .
On the other hand, there are works that focus on the security and privacy issues related to the cloud-computing domain. Mulazzani et al. [52] demonstrate that attackers can exploit data duplication techniques to access customer data by obtaining hash code of the stored file.
A decision support tool based on cost and benefits and risk is proposed for the public IaaS cloud migration [53] . The cost modelling tool enables users to model IT infrastructure using UML. A goal-driven approach is introduced to support analysis of security and privacy risks of cloud based system [5] . Goals, threats and risks are considered from three main components data, service/application, and technical and organisational measures. Some
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39 works identify the security and privacy threats. For instance, Pearson identify that privacy threats differ depending on the type of cloud scenario and lack of user control, potential unauthorized secondary usage, data proliferation are more dominate in public cloud [6] . Sidechannel attack can instantiate new VMs of a target virtual machine so that the new VM can potentially monitor the cache hosted on the same physical machine [7] . There are four possible places where faults can occur in cloud computing: provider-inner, provider-across, provider user and user-across [54] . It is necessary to address any fault arising from these places within the cloud infrastructure.
The above works are important in the field of security modeling. However, while various modeling methods have been presented through these works, none deals with the combination of security and privacy requirements elicitation and none has identified any list of requirements needed by analysis and design methods to support security and privacy in the cloud. Thus, our work aims on contributing to that gap.
Conclusions and future steps
A computing Cloud represents a dynamic environment with many different stakeholders involved in various levels and services, all aiming to provide new and highly innovative services to users and companies. However, the rapid development of this technology has emerged new security and privacy concepts that need to be considered when designing security and privacy related services and systems.
The main aim of this paper is to provide a clear linkage among cloud computing areas, threats within the areas and security and privacy properties. To achieve that aim, we considered a list of security and privacy properties that address threats to critical cloud computing areas. A secondary aim was to provide an initial set of requirements for analysis and design methodologies that are developed in order to consider cloud security and privacy as part of their development process. We believe such requirements would help to develop systematic engineering methodologies for the cloud-computing context and enable analysis and design of critical areas, threats and identified security and privacy properties. As future work, we aim to integrate those requirements into our previous work and develop methodologies that support the security and privacy analysis and design of cloud-based systems. Additionally, we plan to evaluate the applicability of our work, in particular how the identified security and privacy properties support user needs for migration into a cloud and what implementation techniques could support the implementation of the security and privacy properties.
